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1. Introduction 
 
 
Although executive compensation practices in the US and UK have been widely investigated, 
there is little systematic evidence on the pay packages received by top managers in other industrialized 
countries. Continuous debates among employees, regulators and the popular press about the level, 
structure and the role of executive pay in different countries are triggering a lot of academic interest as 
well. An interesting observation from the voluminous body of empirical research is that there is no 
conclusive evidence of a large and positive pay-performance relationship. There are a few studies that 
document even a negative or no relationship.  
The disagreements on pay-performance link are fuelled regularly by new events taking place 
in many Western economies. The recent event in mid 2006, in which a large number of US companies 
are discovered to use backdating stock options in order to reward top executives, seems to suggest that 
companies are camouflaging true compensation levels. In September 2006, the German multinational 
firm Siemens announced a 30% rise in management pay amid negative corporate news like lower 
profits and job cuts. The defense of the Siemens chairman’s decision to increase pay for top managers 
was that more shares and bonuses should bring remuneration into line with that of competitors. 
In the Netherlands, strong criticisms were made on the total compensation of top executives of 
many well-known firms like Royal Dutch Shell, Heineken, Reed-Elsevier, Unilever and Van der 
Moolen. These companies paid their top managers huge increases in 2003-04 and/or 2004-05 
irrespective of the meager performance in those years. Directors of multinational companies like 
Ahold and Royal Dutch Shell were given generous remuneration at the time that these firms were 
performing poorly. Many such practices were regularly reported in national newspapers.1 In a report 
published in December 2006, the Monitoring Commission on Corporate Governance in the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the news items on Ahold and Royal Dutch Shell reported in daily newspapers like Het 
Financieele Dagblad (July 9, 2005) and NRC Handelsblad (May 18, 2006). The daily financial newspaper Het 
Financieele Dagblad (December 9, 2005) also reports the results of a study undertaken by the Association of 
Securities Holders (VEB) which finds that listed firms insufficiently follow the principles of good management 
regarding their pay practices. 
 2
Netherlands has expressed its concern about the lack of transparency on executive compensation of 
Dutch listed firms. 
The aim of this paper is to add to the existing literature by presenting a quantitative analysis of 
executive compensation in the Netherlands and, in particular, to examine the extraordinarily popular 
belief that executive pay should reflect corporate performance. As far as we know, this is the first 
comprehensive study that investigates the pay-performance relationship of Dutch companies.2 
The study contributes to our understanding of the role of managerial remuneration because of 
some interesting features of listed Dutch firms. It is widely known that the pressure from many 
corporate governance mechanisms was very limited in the Netherlands (see De Jong and Veld, 2001 
and De Jong et al., 2005 for a detailed description of Dutch corporate governance features). Dutch 
listed firms are famous for their ingenious use of several anti-takeover defenses that resulted in a bad 
international reputation with respect to corporate governance quality. Managers frequently proclaim 
working towards many goals other than shareholder value maximization. Another remarkable feature 
is that ordinary shareholders have no authority in deciding the remuneration of executive directors. 
This power rests with the board of non-executive directors (popularly known as the Supervisory 
Board). Ownership of Dutch listed firms is also relatively concentrated. There are instances in which 
dominant shareholders of a firm are alleged to collude with the management and influence decisions 
for their own benefits.3 In an empirical study, De Jong et al. (2005) analyze several years of data from 
a sample of 140 Dutch firms and find that major outside shareholders, industrial blockholders and 
financial institutions negatively influence firm value. Different corporate governance rankings have 
consistently placed the Netherlands near the bottom of the league of Western European countries. 
We collect data to analyze the pay-performance relationship of a large sample of Dutch firms 
during the period 1998-2001. We adopt the standard regression model commonly used in the 
                                                 
2 In an earlier study, Duffhues et al. (2002) analyze the relationship between employee stock option grants and 
firm performance. 
3 Events published in the media suggest that the influence of shareholders and non-executive directors on the 
policies of the firm is in general very limited. The condition is improving as time progresses. 
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literature. A robust econometric analysis is performed whereby a variety of regression specifications 
and both accounting and capital market-based firm performance measures are used. This is done 
primarily because firm performance is the key variable of interest and few of the prior studies report 
findings from these vital sensitivity checks. 
The most important result of our study is that the pay-performance relationship is not positive 
for Dutch firms.4 Several empirical tests even indicate a significantly negative pay-performance 
relationship. The finding is robust to alternative model specifications. It also holds after making 
important controls for several factors like firm size, leverage, industry and time. The result lends 
support to those papers which argue that the rationale of paying managerial compensation goes beyond 
the notion put forward by the principal-agent theory. Firms also offer compensation for reasons 
unrelated to corporate performance; for example, to attract, retain and motivate executives, and to 
establish a long-term binding relationship with the rest of the organization. The result is also consistent 
with the managerial entrenchment view which postulates that managers use compensation to extract 
additional rents from the firm. Managers seem to influence their own compensation: higher pay is 
awarded even when firm performance is not increased. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a discussion of competing 
views on executive compensation and some empirical studies. Section 3 presents the methodology we 
use while Section 4 describes the sample selection procedures. The results of the study are presented 
in Section 5. In the final section, we present the summary and conclusions, and discuss some 
extensions for future research. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Although in an ideal setting the most reliable measure of executive compensation would include all major 
components of cash compensation (e.g. salary, cash bonuses and cash pensions) as well as non-cash 
compensation (e.g. value of stock options and shares granted in the year, and the change in value on holdings of 
shares and stock options during the year), data limitations compel us to limit our analysis primarily to cash 
compensation. 
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2. Executive compensation 
 
2.1. Theoretical considerations 
 
Stock exchange listed companies are characterized by the special feature where ownership lies 
in the hands of diverse shareholders and control in the hands of a few professional managers. In the 
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, the widely acclaimed principal-agent theory asserts that 
these (self-interested) managers may not always perform their tasks solely in the interest of 
shareholders. Several mechanisms, therefore, prevail to compel/motivate them to perform their tasks 
accordingly. One such governance mechanism is designing an appropriate incentive scheme that 
aligns the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. These incentives include provision of a 
performance-based pay like cash bonus, stock option grants and common stock grants. Once 
executives receive adequate compensation, they are assumed to work harder and contribute more to 
the increase in corporate performance. The pay-performance relationship is, therefore, expected to be 
positive. 
An important question is whether linking pay to company performance is indeed an effective 
tool in the sense of an 'optimal contracting' device to realize the stated goals of corporations. Huge 
controversy exists on the functioning of each incentive. It is not clear whether firm value increases 
significantly by virtue of incentive compensation provided to managers. In case a specific incentive 
mechanism does not work properly, supporters of the agency theory believe that there are other 
disciplinary mechanisms (e.g. external board members, major shareholders, debt providers, the capital 
market, the takeover market) in place to make sure that shareholder interests are properly served. 
An alternative perspective on executive compensation comes from the managerial power 
theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). It postulates that many corporate governance mechanisms are 
practically ineffective, and therefore, the target goals of firms are formulated by the management itself 
thereby resulting in sub-optimal incentives and rent extraction. They argue that managerial 
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remuneration schemes are in fact designed to secure rents at the expense of other stakeholders in the 
firm. The amount of compensation paid to managers is also 'camouflaged' from the eyes of 
shareholders so that it is no more related to corporate performance. 
 
2.2. Empirical literature 
 
The available research on pay-performance relationship is documented in two widely cited 
survey papers of Murphy (1999) and Core et al. (2003). These surveys, mainly based on US studies 
and covering a variety of issues on compensation, deal with the relationship between chief executive 
officer (CEO) and shareholder wealth. The most accepted evidence is that the relationship is positive, 
and the major driving force behind it is equity-based incentives received by the CEO (Hall and 
Liebman, 1998). The positive pay-performance association confirms the role played by compensation 
in aligning managerial interests with those of the shareholders.5 On the other hand, there are a few 
studies that do not find a positive relationship. Core et al. (1999) document that excess CEO 
compensation has a significant negative association with subsequent stock return as well as operating 
performance. Brick et al. (2006) also find that there is a negative relationship between excess director 
compensation and firm performance. 
Empirical studies from some other countries consistently document that pay-performance 
sensitivity is very low (see Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Buck et al. (2003) for UK, and Haid and 
Yurtoglu (2006) for Germany). A study performed by Zhou (2000) finds a very weak relationship for 
Canadian firms. Firth et al. (2006) also find positive but very low pay-performance sensitivity for 
Chinese listed firms owned by private blockholders. Kato and Kubo (2006) analyze CEO 
compensation of a sample of listed and non-listed Japanese firms. They confirm the positive pay-
performance relationship. On the other hand, analyzing a sample of Portuguese listed companies, 
Fernandes (2006) does not find any link between pay and performance. 
                                                 
5 There is also indication that high pay-performance sensitivity leads managers to engage in higher levels of 
earnings management (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
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The limited and inconclusive evidence of a significant positive pay-performance relationship 
has led many to question the role of compensation as a remedy to the problem of alignment between 
managers and shareholders objectives. Rather, it has been argued by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) that 
compensation is an ingredient of the agency problem itself. They contend that the payment of high 
compensation is an outcome of managerial power and the associated act of rent extraction. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
We adopt the standard empirical literature on executive compensation and use the following 
regression model to test the relationship between pay and firm performance: 
 
Pay i t  =  α0  +  α1 Perf i t  +  α2 Size i t  +  α3 Lev i t +  λ j  +  δ t  +  ε i  t .    (1) 
 
The dependent variable (Payi t) is the amount of compensation paid to executive directors of 
firm i in period t. It is expressed in natural logarithm (to adjust for the non-normality of compensation 
distribution). We construct two proxy measures for executive compensation: cash compensation 
(CASH - consisting of salary, bonus and other cash payments) and total compensation (COMP - 
consisting of the sum of cash compensation and estimated market value of stock options). 
The explanatory variable, firm performance (Perf), is measured in a number of ways. We 
consider both accounting-based and capital market-based performance measures. The first measure is 
return on assets (ROA) defined as the operating earnings over the book value of total assets. The 
second measure is return on sales (ROS) defined as the operating earnings over total sales. Several 
prior studies use ROA or ROS as direct estimates of profitability. The third performance measure, 
annual stock return (RET), is a pure capital market-based metric. Our final proxy for firm performance 
is Q. It is a hybrid of accounting and capital market-based measure defined as the ratio of the sum of 
market value of common shares and book value of debt to book value of total assets. These four 
variables proxy financial performance of firms and have widely been used in investigating corporate 
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performance.6 If executive compensation is predicted to be higher in companies with higher 
performance, then the estimated regression coefficient α1 should be positive. 
In our examination of the pay-performance relationship, we employ variables to control for 
confounding effects. Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of market value of equity (Size), is 
used as the first control variable.7 It is usually believed that executives of larger firms receive 
relatively higher compensation. Leverage is used as another key control variable. It is defined as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets (Lev). Debt holders may closely monitor managerial activities thereby 
reducing the payment of excess compensation. On the other hand, higher debts can also lead to an 
increase in firm risk, which in turn necessitates the payment of higher compensation. We use industry 
(λ) and time (δ) dummies as additional control variables. These dummies pick up common factors that 
are driven by industry- and economy-wide effects. Finally, ε i t is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Several robustness checks are undertaken to estimate the sensitivity of results. The regression 
specification described earlier assumes contemporaneous relationship between executive pay and firm 
performance. In a separate specification, we use lagged performance measures to account for the 
premise that executive compensation paid in one year is usually determined by previous year’s firm 
performance. We carry out another robustness check in which both contemporaneous and lagged 
performance variables are used as explanatory variables in the same regression. Finally, the pay-
performance relationship is also investigated running cross-sectional regressions of average pay on 
average performance.8 Since there is no systematic evidence of a contradictory result from all these 
robustness checks, we do not present the full set of regression results in the paper. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Q is used as a proxy for firm value in several studies (e.g. Cheung et al., 2006, De Jong et al., 2005). A large 
number of studies in the management literature also use Q as a proxy of firm performance. 
7 We also use (in non-reported regressions) logarithm of total assets and total sales as alternative firm size 
measures and find qualitatively similar results. 
8 We thank Beni Lauterbach for suggesting these alternative regression specifications. 
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4. Data 
 
Until April 2002, Dutch firms were not legally obliged to make public the amount of 
compensation paid to CEO and other directors. Company annual reports are the only medium in which 
compensation information is voluntarily disclosed in the Netherlands. There exists no database that 
systematically collects compensation information for Dutch listed firms. Therefore, the only 
possibility is to hand-collect the data. 
The data collection process involving all firms listed on the Euronext Amsterdam started in 
early-2003. Almost 750 annual reports are manually collected for the years 1998-2001. In each annual 
report, we search for information on executive pay. About two-third of listed firms are found to reveal 
the amount of compensation paid to executive directors. Our empirical analysis is thus based on 
almost all listed firms for which managerial remuneration data are disclosed (annual average number 
of firms = 135).  
In the United States, listed firms are required to disclose compensation data of the five highest-
paid executives. Most US empirical studies analyze data on CEO compensation only. In contrast, it 
was common for Dutch companies to report the aggregate compensation of the entire top management 
team, i.e. all executive directors (members of the Management board). Thus, it was impossible to get 
information on the compensation received by each director. While a few large firms voluntarily 
reported compensation of CEO or each executive director separately during our study period, most 
firms simply reported the aggregate compensation. Smaller companies with only one executive 
director did not disclose any information at all due to privacy right. Moreover, while a few large firms 
reported annual salary and bonus separately, most firms report cash compensation as the sum of these 
two components. For the majority of firms, annual salary and bonuses of all executive directors are 
considered as cash compensation. For several firms, the amount of cash compensation also includes 
pension payments and compensation paid to retiring directors. 
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As for executive stock options, we observe that less than two-thirds of firms disclose the 
number of total outstanding stock options whereas nearly 50% of firms report information on stock 
option grants. Among the firms that report the number of stock options granted during the year, a 
majority of them do not disclose their estimated market value. The number of firms used in our 
analysis therefore varies across different components of compensation because of limitations on data 
availability. For a small sub-set of firms (ranging between 14 firms in 1998 and 30 firms in 2001), we 
are able to calculate the amount of total compensation by adding the value of stock options with cash 
compensation.9 
In addition to the information on executive pay, we collect annual data on various firm 
performance measures and key control variables like firm size and leverage. This required collection 
of balance sheet and income statement data. We compile these from annual reports of firms and the 
annual publication Handbook of Dutch Companies. Stock price data are first collected from 
Datastream, and whenever necessary, complemented with that from the financial newspaper. We also 
classify sample firms into different industry groups based on the SIC classification of Compustat 
Global. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 1 presents yearly summary statistics of executive compensation for the sample of Dutch 
listed firms. To allow a meaningful comparison over time, we express all monetary amounts in 
constant prices of 2000. We observe that in 1998, the firms in our sample paid its top management 
team an average cash compensation of €1.527 million (median = €0.968 million). In general, the 
amount of cash compensation paid in 1999 and 2000 remained somewhat stable. But, there was a 
                                                 
9 Due to data limitation, we are unable to estimate for all sample firms the Black-Scholes approximated market 
value of executive stock options. 
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major increase in average cash compensation in 2001: the mean annual cash compensation paid to 
executive directors is €2.177 million (median = €1.195 million). Using data of 540 firm-years during 
the four year time-period, we find that the amount of cash compensation paid to executive directors of 
an average Dutch firm is €1.741 million. The low value of the median reflects the fact that the sample 
consists of a few firms paying relatively high amount of executive compensation. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
For a smaller sample (95 firm-years), it was possible to collect data on the value of stock 
options granted to the executive directors. When this value is added to cash compensation received by 
them, the mean (median) total compensation is €6.492 million (€4.669 million). This higher amount 
reflects the significant role played by stock options in executive compensation. It is also an outcome of 
increased valuation of share prices that prevailed during early 2000s. 
Descriptive statistics of other variables of interest are presented in Table 2. Panel A provides 
information on firm performance measures while Panel B on key firm characteristics. Similar to the 
previous table, the statistics reported in Table 2 are based on about 500 firm-years. The accounting 
measures of firm performance are positive for a typical firm: the ROA of an average firm is 8.1% 
while the ROS is 6.2%. But, the average annual stock return is –0.7% (median = 4.8%). The hybrid 
performance measure Q is positive over the sample period. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As for the firm characteristics, we use three different measures (total assets, total sales and 
stock market capitalization) as a proxy for firm size. We observe that the median firm in our sample 
has total assets of €365 millions, total sales of €458 millions and equity capitalization of €220 
millions. A few large multinational firms are responsible for higher values of means. The average debt 
ratio of sample firms is 62%. 
Analyzing information on the distribution of sample firms across industries, we observe that a 
little less than one-third of firms (168 firm-year observations) come from the manufacturing sector. 
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Transportation, trade and services sector represents 48% of firms (258 observations). There are only 
8% of firms (45 observations) in the financial institutions sector, whereas the information and 
communication technology industry comprises of 13% of firms (68 firm-year observations). In the 
analysis that follows, we control for these differences in industry composition by using industry 
dummies in regressions. In a subsequent robustness analysis, we also report separate results for each 
industry. 
 
5.2. Regression analysis 
 
Table 3 presents multivariate regression results for cash compensation. In Panel A, we show 
results assuming that the pay-performance relationship is contemporaneous. In Columns (1) to (4), the 
results are presented for the four different performance metrics used in the study. The regression 
specifications are similar except that we replace one performance measure with another. The number 
of firm-year observations used in these regressions varies from 500 to 532. Besides firm-specific 
factors like firm size and leverage, we include time and industry dummies as additional control 
variables (regression estimates on time and industry dummies are not reported in the table for the sake 
of brevity). The results of regressions show that executive pay is significantly negatively related to 
return on assets, returns on sales, stock return and Q. It is quite remarkable to observe that all four 
performance variables consistently indicate a statistically significant negative relationship. The high 
values of explanatory power (adjusted R2) and F-statistic are also indicative of the reliability of 
regression models. 
The coefficients of control variables have the same sign and roughly similar magnitude across 
all model specifications. The logarithm of market value of equity (a proxy for firm size) is found to be 
a positive and statistically significant determinant of compensation. This positive link is a well-
established finding in executive compensation studies. Leverage has a significant positive influence on 
executive pay. It is not consistent with the usual agency explanation asserting that a high amount of 
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debt is associated with an increased monitoring of managers by the suppliers of debt, and therefore, a 
lower level of managerial remuneration. Rather it indicates that higher leverage increases firm risk 
thereby requiring the payment of a higher amount of compensation to executives. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
One can argue that a non-contemporaneous pay-performance relationship, i.e. directors’ 
remuneration of current year is influenced by previous year's firm performance, can be a more 
appropriate representation of the reality. In order to test this hypothesis, we perform additional cross-
sectional regressions by assuming the existence of a lagged relationship. Panel B reports the results of 
these tests. Similar to Panel A, we present results for all four performance measures in Columns (5) to 
(8). The most notable finding is, once again, the negative pay-performance relationship. The estimated 
coefficients of performance variables are roughly of the same magnitude in both contemporaneous 
(Panel A) and lagged regressions (Panel B). Only the coefficient of stock return is statistically 
insignificant. As before, the control variables have similar signs and are statistically significant. The 
explanatory power of each regression is still high (more than 60%), and the values of F-statistics 
indicate that all independent variables are jointly significant. 
The results from Table 3 clearly suggest that cash compensation paid to executives of Dutch 
firms is significantly negatively related to firm performance. The finding lends insufficient support to 
the argument that managerial remuneration acts as an incentive to superior firm performance. Rather, 
it is consistent with the propositions that managers can influence their own compensation and 
powerful managers can use pay to extract rents out of the firm for their private benefits. The evidence 
can also indicate the inability of Supervisory Board members in designing properly the pay structure 
of executive directors. Considering the fact that during the time-period of our study not a great deal of 
corporate governance pressure existed for the executives of Dutch firms, the absence of a positive pay-
performance relationship is not a surprising result. Brick et al. (2006) argue that in an environment 
where managers put their self-interests above those of shareholders – a phenomenon popularly known 
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as cronyism – it is quite possible to find a negative pay-performance relationship. In another study, 
Collins et al. (2006) find that US firms with weaker corporate governance features are more engaged 
in adopting the practice of executive stock option backdating. Our findings are fairly consistent with 
those from a few international studies indicating that the pay-performance relationship is either very 
weak or absent (Buck et al., 2003; Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006; Fernandes, 2006). 
The results of the study can also indicate that the purpose of awarding higher remuneration to 
managers goes beyond that of influencing corporate performance alone. There are other important 
justifications like that of attracting and retaining talented executives, and establishing a long-term 
binding relationship of managers with the firm. The evidence should not be interpreted as an approval 
of paying exorbitant amount of compensation to executives. Nor, should it be used against the 
requirement of benchmarking compensation to firm performance. It indicates that the 'ex post' 
discovery of the lack of a positive pay-performance link can be attributable to a number of legitimate 
reasons. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
 
The regressions reported in Table 3 include annual firm-level observations from each sample 
year (from 1998 to 2001). We replicate the analysis by using all four years of data available for every 
firm and running new cross-sectional regressions with four-year average values. Table 4 shows these 
results. The regression estimates for two firm performance proxies represented by RET and Q are 
negative and statistically significant. The coefficients of two other performance variables (ROA and 
ROS) are also negative but insignificant. These results are consistent with the earlier finding of a 
negative pay-performance relationship. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
To further investigate the pay-performance relationship in detail, we repeat the analysis for 
each industry and each year separately. We report in Table 5 the results of four industry groups used in 
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this study. As before, four different performance measures are used. With the largest number of 
observations for the manufacturing sector, we observe that the regression coefficients for all 
performance variables are negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the results 
obtained earlier. The results from the transportation, trade and services sector are similar, but the 
coefficients of ROA and ROS are not significantly different from zero. For regressions involving firms 
in the information and communication technology sector, the return on assets variable has a significant 
negative coefficient. The only contradictory result is observed for regressions involving financial 
institutions. Here we find that the pay-performance relationship is positive. With 10-11 firms present 
in this industry (about 42 firm-year observations), the positive coefficients associated with the 
performance measures can be interpreted as anomalous.10 Turning to the yearly analysis, the results 
(not reported here) show that several coefficients of performance variables are negative and 
statistically significant. There is no coefficient of pay with a significant positive sign. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We perform a few more robustness analyses. To check whether the prior obtained results are 
influenced by the use of market value of equity as a proxy for firm size, we re-estimate all regressions 
using the logarithm of book value of total assets. We find no systematic evidence of a positive pay-
performance relationship. In another analysis, we include both contemporaneous and lagged 
performance measures as explanatory variables in the same regression specification. Once again, no 
contradictory finding is observed. Overall, the results of all robustness checks are consistent: there is 
no systematic evidence that an increase in firm performance is associated with higher cash 
compensation of executive directors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Since accounting-based performance measures of financial firms are less reliable, studies usually exclude 
financial firms from the analysis. Although the reported regression results use industry dummies as additional 
control variables, the sub-sample results presented here indicate that excluding financial firms from the full 
sample will lead to a more negative pay-performance relationship.  
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5.4. Total compensation 
 
Although the results presented above and the robustness checks do not exhibit conflicting 
findings, one can criticize our results by saying that the measure of compensation used so far is not 
adequate because it ignores the most important component of incentive compensation, namely the 
value of executive stock options. As mentioned earlier, an estimate of the market value of stock 
options is not disclosed by most firms, nor was it possible for us to estimate it. We deal with this 
concern by making a separate analysis of firms for which the required data are publicly available (the 
sample ranges between 14 firms in 1998 and 30 firms in 2001). A new variable – total compensation – 
is constructed which is the sum of salary, bonus and all other cash payments plus the (reported) value 
of stock options. We repeat the previous regressions but now use total compensation as the dependent 
variable. The explanatory variables remain unchanged. 
In Table 6, we present the results. The first four columns provide the results under the 
assumption of contemporaneous pay-performance relationship, and the last four columns present those 
for lagged relationship. The only statistically significant relationship that we observe from the Table is 
that of a negative association between total compensation and firm performance as measured by Q.11 
The contemporaneous regression specification (Column 4) generates a coefficient of -0.13 (t-statistic = 
1.84) whereas the lagged specification (Column 8) provides a regression coefficient of -0.06 (t-statistic 
= 2.60). Thus, the statistical analysis with total compensation that includes the market value of 
executive stock options does not lead to a different result.12 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Since a large decline has taken place in the number of observations used in these regressions, it is not 
unexpected to observe a lower level of statistical significance. 
12 Hall and Liebman (1998) therefore argued to use a more comprehensive definition of executive compensation 
by including the change in wealth from stock options and stock price increased/decreases. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This study contributes to the growing literature on executive pay by analyzing data from the 
Netherlands. Our primary purpose is to examine whether the amount of remuneration paid to 
executives of Dutch listed firms is related to corporate performance. The analysis is of importance 
because Dutch firms provide an interesting scenario: there is relatively limited functioning of many 
corporate governance mechanisms. For example, the market for corporate control is almost non-
existent due to the presence of a large number of anti-takeover devices and high ownership 
concentration. The independent role of non-executive directors has also been questioned by many. 
We observe that the available theoretical framework and empirical studies do not provide a 
clear-cut picture on the pay-performance relationship. The most widely acknowledged principal-agent 
theory postulates that compensation being a major incentive mechanism would help in aligning 
managerial interests with those of the shareholders. Therefore, the reward company executives usually 
obtain would truly reflect corporate performance. On the other hand, the managerial power theory 
proposes that executive pay, being a kind of rent-seeking activity on the part of powerful managers, 
may not necessarily demonstrate a pay-performance relationship. 
We analyze the remuneration data of entire top management team of a large sample of Dutch 
listed firms during the period 1998-2001. The analysis is mostly based on cash compensation because 
the vast majority of Dutch firms did not disclose sufficient information to allow estimation of the non-
cash component. We find no systematic evidence that executive pay of Dutch firms is positively 
related to corporate performance. Of particular interest are our results from a large number of 
regressions that show a statistically significant negative pay-performance relationship. Since a concern 
exists on how to measure corporate performance properly, we construct four different proxies 
reflecting both accounting-based and capital market-based definitions. In order to make appropriately 
controls for the potential impact of other factors, we use firm size, capital structure, industry affiliation 
and time period as key variables. A variety of robustness checks are also performed. None leads us to 
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believe that the pay-performance relationship is positive. The finding is consistent with the 
propositions that managers are able to influence their own compensation, and managerial 
entrenchment is more likely to take place when there is less corporate governance pressure. It is also 
consistent with the premise that many directors receive pay for non-performance related reasons. 
One can argue why, in the corporate governance system prevailing in the Netherlands, 
shareholders with large ownership stakes will accept a policy of “pay-for-no-performance”. We 
believe that there is some degree of collusion between blockholders and management. Many 
blockholders are more concerned with the existing business interests (e.g. receive a high dividend pay 
out, remain a supplier or a client of the firm), so that there is an increased risk of loosing more by 
being critical against management’s compensation policy.13 Prior empirical research from the 
Netherlands also demonstrates that major outside shareholders, industrial blockholders and financial 
institutions negatively influence firm value (De Jong et al., 2005). 
Although it appears to be an intriguing finding, our study is broadly in line with the vast 
amount of work in the finance and management literature that fails to find a positive relationship 
between executive compensation and firm performance. In a meta-analysis of about 50 compensation 
studies, Tosi et al. (2000) find that less than five percent explained variance of CEO pay is attributed 
to firm performance measures. 
Some limitations of our study deserve to be mentioned so that these issues can be addressed in 
future research. For example, the period of analysis can be extended to recent years and total 
compensation can be estimated for a large number of firms. Although we are fully aware of the 
difficulties involved in assembling a similar panel data set for Dutch firms, corporate governance 
recommendations of recent years for a full disclosure of executive pay practices will undoubtedly 
alleviate some of the burden. The definition of total compensation used in this study can also be 
                                                 
13 The CEO of Essent (a large Dutch public utility firm) was highly criticized in 2005 for receiving exorbitant 
pay, but large shareholders were not very eager in demanding a change in the compensation package. Only after 
high pressure from the public these shareholders, many of them were dependent for their municipal budgets in 
receiving a high dividend from the firm, gave some support to the public's outrage about high CEO pay. 
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extended by including other important items, especially value of stocks granted, capital gains/losses on 
holdings of stocks and options during the year, and pension benefits. The findings of our study can 
solely be attributed to these missing items. Another issue is the inclusion of corporate governance 
variables and executives’ personal characteristics as additional control variables. Several studies from 
the US find strong effects of these factors on CEO pay. It would be interesting to see if the addition of 
these new variables, in conceivably less-effective institutional environment, can still change our 
results. Limitations on data availability precluded us from doing these analyses. Finally, there can be 
methodological extensions of the study. We have followed the extant literature in measuring the pay-
performance relationship over a short time interval. This may not be an adequate representation of the 
reality. Since executive directors claim to be more concerned with the long-run interests of a company, 
a model depicting contemporaneous or one-year lag relationship may fail to capture the total 
performance effect. A simultaneous equation framework to control for endogeneity, a non-linear pay-
performance relationship and even non-financial performance measures may be better representations. 
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Table 1. 
Executive compensation in the Netherlands 
 
The table shows summary statistics of compensation paid to the entire top management team (all executive 
directors) of Dutch firms. Panel A presents statistics for cash compensation (salary, bonus and other cash 
payments) while Panel B reports those for total compensation (cash compensation plus value of stock options). 
Compensation is expressed in thousands of Euros and in constant 2000 price. 
 
 
  Mean Median St. dev. No. of obs. 
Panel A: Cash compensation     
 1998 1527 968 1576 133 
 1999 1524 865 1722 143 
 2000 1774 861 2172 138 
 2001 2177 1195 2742 126 
 1998-2001 1741 900 2098 540 
Panel B: Total compensation     
 1998 6304 4703 5075 14 
 1999 5346 4464 2993 22 
 2000 6868 4779 4578 29 
 2001 7058 4638 5531 30 
 1998-2001 6492 4669 4658 95 
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Table 2. 
Summary statistics 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics of firm performance and firm characteristics for a sample of Dutch firms. 
Panel A shows the four performance metrics: return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), annual stock return 
(RET) and Q. Panel B shows several major firm characteristics: total assets (TA), total sales (TS), market value 
of equity (MVE) and leverage (LEV).  
 
 
 Mean Median St. dev. No. of obs. 
Panel A: Firm performance metrics     
ROA 0.081 0.092 0.206 536 
ROS 0.062 0.068 0.257 532 
RET -0.007 -0.048 0.415 505 
Q 2.065 1.276 2.202 540 
Panel B. Firm characteristics     
TA (mln €) 14,100 365 76,500 540 
TS (mln €) 2,751 458 7,908 540 
MVE (mln €) 2,880 220 9,173 540 
LEV 0.616 0.637 0.199 533 
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Table 3. 
Regression results for cash compensation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of cash compensation (salary, bonus and other cash payments) paid to 
all executive directors. Firm performance is measured by ROA, ROS, RET and Q. Firm size and leverage are 
measured by MVE and LEV, respectively. Each regression uses industry and time dummies as additional 
controls (these coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity). The absolute t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Contemporaneous relationship 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 8.643 *** (41.66) 
8.746*** 
(41.02) 
8.551*** 
(39.60) 
8.951*** 
(42.27) 
ROA -0.484*** (3.21)    
ROS  
-0.296** 
(2.28)   
RET   
-0.249*** 
(3.20)  
Q    
-0.078*** 
(4.74) 
Ln(MVE) 0.384*** (28.21) 
0.376*** 
(27.02) 
0.382*** 
(27.59) 
0.388*** 
(28.62) 
LEV 0.428*** (2.62) 
0.394** 
(2.45) 
0.512*** 
(3.26) 
0.406** 
(2.51) 
Adj.  R2 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 
F-statistic 116.83 108.06 113.58 123.31 
No. of obs. 528 524 500 532 
 
Panel B: Lagged relationship 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 8.760*** (37.18) 
8.724*** 
(35.89) 
8.690*** 
(34.15) 
9.048*** 
(34.35) 
ROA (-1) -0.391** (2.09)    
ROS (-1)  
-0.248* 
(1.85)   
RET (-1)   
-0.158 
(1.49)  
Q (-1)    
-0.060*** 
(3.33) 
Ln(MVE) 0.381*** (24.47) 
0.379*** 
(23.45) 
0.380*** 
(21.48) 
0.388*** 
(23.95) 
LEV 0.462** (2.51) 
0.475** 
(2.46) 
0.510*** 
(2.58) 
0.366** 
(1.99) 
Adj.  R2 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.63 
F-statistic 104.97 94.14 86.35 100.75 
No. of obs. 382 381 360 384 
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Table 4. 
Results of contemporaneous regressions using annual averages 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares and all 
variables are calculated as four-year averages. The dependent variable in each specification is cash compensation 
(salary, bonus and other cash payments) paid to all executive directors. Firm performance is measured by ROA, 
ROS, RET and Q. Firm size and leverage are measured by MVE and LEV, respectively. Each regression uses 
industry dummies as additional controls (these coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity). The absolute 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 8.293 *** (30.73) 
8.279*** 
(29.02) 
8.058*** 
(29.67) 
8.690*** 
(30.63) 
ROA -0.334 (1.24)    
ROS  -0.154 (0.89)   
RET   -0.539*** (2.96)  
Q    -0.074*** (3.21) 
Ln(MVE) 0.401*** (18.92) 
0.399*** 
(18.47) 
0.413*** 
(20.19) 
0.404*** 
(19.21) 
LEV 0.257 (1.08) 
0.286 
(1.18) 
0.258 
(1.16) 
0.122 
(0.52) 
R2 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.69 
F-statistic 84.08 79.11 91.61 87.34 
No. of obs. 174 174 172 176 
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Table 5. 
Results of regression analysis for each industry 
 
The table presents the contemporaneous regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares. The dependent variable in 
each specification is the natural logarithm of cash compensation (salary, bonus and other cash payments) paid to all executive directors. Firm 
performance is measured by ROA, ROS, RET and Q. Firm size and leverage are measured by MVE and LEV, respectively. Each regression uses 
year dummies as additional controls (these coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity). The absolute t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Manufacturing Transportation, Trade & Services Information and Communication Technology Financial Institutions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Constant 8.940*** (28.30) 
8.943*** 
(28.48) 
8.640*** 
(27.22) 
9.033*** 
(29.39) 
8.861*** 
(28.16) 
8.928*** 
(27.01) 
8.743*** 
(28.17) 
8.865*** 
(29.88) 
8.319*** 
(11.88) 
8.392*** 
(11.42) 
8.557*** 
(11.04) 
8.772*** 
(13.26) 
8.071*** 
(21.46) 
9.097*** 
(21.32) 
9.627*** 
(16.89) 
8.059*** 
(15.70) 
ROA -0.645** (2.20)    
-0.225 
(0.84)    
-0.511** 
(2.02)    
3.970*** 
(3.12)    
ROS  -0.830*** (3.16)    
-0.081 
(0.37)    
-0.359 
(1.51)    
1.411*** 
(4.17)   
RET   -0.362*** (2.66)    
-0.345** 
(2.46)    
-0.127 
(0.67)    
0.269 
(1.10)  
Q    -0.102*** (3.58)    
-0.144*** 
(3.03)    
-0.033 
(1.15)    
0.332*** 
(3.59) 
Ln(MVE) 0.371*** (18.58) 
0.378*** 
(18.38) 
0.380*** 
(18.07) 
0.381*** 
(18.36) 
0.430*** 
(16.68) 
0.425*** 
(16.82) 
0.430*** 
(18.26) 
0.440*** 
(19.21) 
0.431*** 
(8.73) 
0.417*** 
(8.19) 
0.409*** 
(7.76) 
0.402*** 
(8.22) 
0.312*** 
(11.80) 
0.330*** 
(12.72) 
0.296*** 
(10.05) 
0.313*** 
(10.38) 
LEV 0.628** (2.41) 
0.539** 
(2.08) 
.810*** 
(3.26) 
0.474* 
(1.86) 
-0.068 
(0.31) 
-0.092 
(0.40) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
0.016 
(0.08) 
0.248 
(0.63) 
0.438 
(1.23) 
0.238 
(0.60) 
0.289 
(0.71) 
2.556*** 
(7.42) 
0.779* 
(2.00) 
1.345** 
(2.08) 
2.294*** 
(6.34) 
Adj.  R2 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.80 
F-stat. 60.08 58.46 57.38 60.55 54.50 53.40 68.56 83.19 17.39 16.21 14.77 13.86 95.09 44.60 28.67 70.68 
Obs. 257 256 246 257 163 161 153 165 66 66 60 66 42 41 41 44 
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Table 6. 
Results of contemporaneous and lagged regressions for total compensation 
 
The table presents the regression results where the estimation method is the ordinary least squares. The dependent variable in each specification is 
the natural logarithm of total compensation (cash compensation plus value of stock options) made available to all executive directors. Firm 
performance is measured by ROA, ROS, RET and Q. Firm size and leverage are measured by MVE and LEV, respectively. Each regression uses 
industry and time dummies as additional controls (these coefficients are not reported for the sake of brevity). The absolute t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 10.03*** 
(16.34) 
10.01*** 
(15.85) 
10.01*** 
(16.58) 
10.00*** 
(15.59) 
Constant 10.49*** 
(13.98) 
10.25*** 
(13.37) 
10.43*** 
(14.57) 
10.54*** 
(14.66) 
ROA 0.34 
(0.83)    
ROA(-1) -0.22 
(0.70)    
ROS 
 
0.10 
(0.40)   
ROS(-1) 
 
0.32 
(1.48)   
RET 
  
-0.03 
(0.27)  
RET(-1) 
  
-0.11 
(0.87)  
Q 
   
-0.13* 
(1.84) 
Q(-1) 
   
-0.06* 
(2.60) 
Ln(MVE) 0.36*** 
(9.64) 
0.36*** 
(9.49) 
0.36*** 
(9.78) 
0.39*** 
(9.41) 
Ln(MVE) 0.34*** 
(7.85) 
0.34*** 
(7.83) 
0.34*** 
(8.13) 
0.36*** 
(8.19) 
LEV 0.50 
(1.19) 
0.49 
(1.18) 
0.48 
(1.16) 
0.45 
(0.94) 
LEV 0.39 
(0.82) 
0.46 
(0.94) 
0.41 
(0.87) 
0.21 
(0.52) 
Adj.  R2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 Adj.  R2 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.57 
F-statistic 26.41 26.66 26.35 25.72 F-statistic 15.71 15.39 17.12 17.19 
No. of obs. 95 95 95 95 No. of obs. 81 81 75 81 
 
 
